Logic List Mailing Archive

Mental Representations in a Mechanical World

28-29 Nov 2019
Bochum, Germany

CFP: Mental Representations in a Mechanical World (Bochum, 28.-29.11.2019)

Date: 28.-29.11.2019
Venue: Beckmanns Hof, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Germany

Description:

The concept of representation is ubiquitous in cognitive science and in the 
philosophy of mind. It seems to play two roles: on the one hand, neural 
representationsare postulated by neuroscientists to explain sub-personal 
phenomena such as the processing of visual information in the brain. On the 
other hand, mental representations are taken to explain person-level phenomena, 
such as imagination, or consciousness. Mental representations are used to make 
sense of beliefs and other propositional attitudes and posits of folk 
psychology. Non-representationalists contend that postulating representations 
of any sort is unnecessary or problematic. Especially the traditional objection 
against representationalism, the causal impotence of representational content, 
gets new force in the light of the new-mechanical approach to explanation in 
life sciences. According to the new mechanists, to explain a phenomenon is to 
show how it is produced by an underlying mechanism. The challenge for 
representationalists is to explain how representations can figure in these 
mechanisms and show that mental representations have a place in a mechanical 
world.
One core question of this workshop is whether the status of neural and mental 
representation is equally problematic. While sub-personal phenomena seem to be 
less resistant to mechanistic explanation, many personal-level mental phenomena 
seem to be ?representation hungry?.
A second core question concerns the relationship between neural and mental 
representations. It is often assumed that the former are needed to account for 
the latter. However, naturalising neural representations, and accounting for 
their explanatory utility in a mechanistic neuroscience proves difficult. How 
intertwined are beliefs and desires with neural representations? Do they only 
come together, or is a conceptual repertoire including one but not the other a 
coherent possibility?

Speakers:
Joe Dewhurst (LMU)
Carrie Figdor (Iowa)
Jolien Francken (Amsterdam)
Matej Kohar (RUB)
Beate Krickel (RUB)
Marcin Milkowski (Polish Academy of Sciences)
Karina Vold (Cambridge)

Call for Papers: A number of further presentation slots have been reserved for 
interested scholars selected by double-blind peer review process. The 
contributions should be suitable for a 30 minute presentation. To apply, submit 
an anonymised abstract of 1000 words making the thesis and argument of your 
contribution transparent by 16th June via EasyChair: 
https://easychair.org/conferences/?conf=mrmw2019. Selected participants will be 
notified by the end of August.

Call for Registration: Participation is free but space is limited. Please 
register by Nov. 1 by filling in the form on 
http://meta4e.com/workshop-registration/.

Organisation: Matej Kohár, Dr. Beate Krickel (as part of Meta4E 
[www.meta4e.com])

Financial support:  Ruhr-University Research School PLUS, funded by Germany?s 
Excellence Initiative [DFG GSC 98/3], DFG Research Training Group ?Situated 
Cognition?, and Prof. Dr. Albert Newen.
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