Logic List Mailing Archive

"Confirmation, Induction and Science", London, March 2007

Three-day conference at the London School of Economics, 8-10 March 2007

Confirmation, Induction and Science

The conference is a joint conference of the Center for Philosophy of
Science, University of Pittsburgh, and LSE?s Centre for Philosophy of
Natural and Social Science (CPNSS)

Conference website:
http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/CPNSS/events/Conferences/ConfirmationInduc
tionandScience/Confirmation2007.htm

Deadline for submissions: 1 October 2006

A few travel bursaries for graduate students are available. We also offer
an award of US$ 500 for the best submitted paper by a graduate student.

Keynote speakers: Philip Dawid (University College London) and Malcolm
Forster (University of Wisconsin, Madison)

Organisers: Stephan Hartmann (LSE) and John Norton (University of
Pittsburgh)

Programme committee: Nancy Cartwright (LSE), Philip Dawid (University
College London), Branden Fitelson, (University of California, Berkeley),
Malcolm Forster (University of Wisconsin, Madison), Allan Franklin
(University of Colorado, Boulder), Stephan Hartmann (LSE), John Norton
(University of Pittsburgh), Jon Williamson (University of Kent), and John
Worrall (LSE)

What distinguishes science from all other human endeavours is that the
accounts of the world that our best, mature sciences deliver are strongly
supported by evidence and this evidence gives us the strongest reason to
believe them. While this is the distinctive mark of science, unanimity has
still to emerge among philosophers of science about the logic of
confirmation and induction used to relate evidence to science.  The state
of these logics stands in stark contrast to that of deductive logic, where
there is essentially no dispute over which are the good systems of
deductive logic. Opinions on confirmation and induction diverge wildly in
philosophy of science. At one extreme are those such as the Bayesians or
learning theorists, who believe that the true system of inductive logic
has been found and all that needs to be resolved are the details. At the
other are skeptics, such as some supporters of the underdetermination
thesis, who hold that no logic can vindicate the level of support
scientists claim for their best, mature theories, for, they urge, the real
inductive import of evidence cannot be that decisive. Between these
extreme are many intermediate positions, including the view that the very
nature of inductive inference remains poorly understood.

Our goal in this conference is to bring together representatives from as
many of these viewpoints as possible in order to advance our understanding
of this problem. The conference will encourage contributions from
philosophers of science with both systematic and critical perspectives as
well as papers that develop revealing case studies in science.

The conference is generously supported by the Centre for Philosophy of
Science, University of Pittsburgh, LSE?s Centre for Philosophy of Natural
and Social Science (CPNSS), the British Society for the Philosophy of
Science, and the Mind Association.