17-18 Oct 2014
Fort Wayne IN, U.S.A.
HEGEL, ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY, AND FORMAL LOGIC JOINT CONFERENCE WITH THE INDIANA PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION OCTOBER 17-18, 2014 IPFW ? WALB STUDENT UNION CO-SPONSORED BY THE IPA, SCHOOL OF PHILOSOPHICAL AND HISTORICAL STUDIES OF THE UNIVERSITY OF SYDNEY, AND THE PHILOSOPHY DEPARTMENT OF THE INDIANA UNIVERSITY-PURDUE UNIVERSITY FORT WAYNE CAMPUS (IPFW). The Co- Organizers are Paul Redding (University of Sydney) and Clark Butler (Purdue University-Indiana-Purdue Fort Wayne Campus). Registration except for plenary invited speakers is $20 paid on-site at the IPA desk at the conference by cash or check. This covers refreshments and luncheon buffet selections at the conference site. Attendees not on the present program are invited to email butler@ipfw.edu of their intentions of attending. Any who who, reading an abstract below, wishes to respond may request a full draft. Other inquiries may be sent to the same email address. FRIDAY, OCTOBER 17 9:00 A.M. BENCIVENGA, ERMANNO ? University of California?Irvine On the Very Possibility of a Formal Logic, and Why Dialectical Logic Cannot Be One Aristotelian and post-Aristotelian (including Fregean) logic is based on identifying a common relational pattern across an indefinite number of linguistic performances, specifically one that brings out relations of contrariety among predicates and sentences and develops the modality involved in those relations (contraries cannot be true together) into the necessary link between premises and conclusions in arguments. Dialectical logic, on the other hand, is always attentive to the entire detail of a linguistic performance, hence cannot lose touch of part of it (the "content") to concentrate on some other, ?essential,? part (the ?form?). It cannot be formal; and the necessity relevant to it is not exclusionary and definitive in the way allowed by the admission of contraries. It is the necessity of a living, growing process. 11:00 A.M. BORDIGNON, MICHELA ? University of Padova (Italy) and University of Porto Allegra (Brazil) Hegel?s Logic and the Liar?s Paradox I will seek to demonstrate that the structure of the liar paradox provides a good explicative model of the way contradictions arise in Hegel?s logic. My aim will not be to outline a formalization of Hegel?s dialectical process, but to point out a general scheme of the dynamic through which contradictions are involved in Hegel?s dialectic, in order to underline a determining feature of these contradictions and, more generally, of speculative logic itself. This feature is the self- referential character of negation, that does not imply contradictory relations between opposite determinations, but the self-contradictory articulations of the determinations themselves. Of course, this general scheme is articulated in different forms in the logic, depending of the specific logical content each time in question. 11:00 A.M. LOEWE, CAN LAURENS ? Catholic University of Leuven (Belgium) Hegel?s Mature System as Immaterialist Priority Monism The goal of this paper is to argue for two claims concerning the mature Hegelian system as expounded in the Encyclopedia and the Science of Logic: a metaphysical and a logical claim. The metaphysical claim is that the mature Hegelian system constitutes a defense of an ontological position that can be characterized, in Jonathan Schaffer?s term, as a immaterialist priority monism. That is to say, Hegel holds, I argue, (i) that exactly one entity ultimately exists, (ii) that this entity is immaterial, and (iii) that other entities exist, but only in a derivate sense. The logical claim is that Hegel?s position cannot be adequately represented by standard first order predicate logic. 12:00 P.M. HENTRUP, MILES ? Stony Brook University Hegel and Kant on the Truth of Contradiction Hegel acclaims Immanuel Kant's work as ?the foundation and the starting point of the new German philosophy,? a merit ?of which it can boast undiminished by whatever fault may be found in it.? Though he does not specify what this foundation may be, he has in mind Kant's a transcen- dental logic as a science of the mere forms of thinking. Yet it remains difficult fact to determine the extent to which he considers the Kantian problematic the actual "foundation" for his own thinking, as the faults he finds in Kant's formulation of a science of logic are as substantial. I will reconstruct of Kant's Antinomy of Pure Reason present Hegel's treatment of it in the Science of Logic. Hegel's reception of Kant's critical philosophy hinges on the notion of contradiction offered but insufficiently developed by Kant. I will situate Kant's discussion of the antinomies within his a transcendental logic. I will exhibit his articula-tion, proof, and resolution of the third antinomy. After presenting the notion of contradiction informing Hegel's approach to the antinomies in general and his critique of the third in particular, I conclude that critique led Hegel to depart from Kant in his science of logic, reconceiving it in terms of the unity of thought and being, and developing a new understanding of truth on this basis. 12:00 P.M. PANEL DISCUSSION: LOCATING HEGEL ON THE MAP OF METAPHYSICAL POSITIONS 1:00 P.M. CAMMI, LORENZO ? Visiting Scholar, University of Pittsburgh, 2014; University of Verona (Italy) Towards a Hegelian Conception of Dispositionality Whereas the realization of dispositional properties is a physical one, the dispositionality of substance refers to a metaphysical realization?. As I conceive it, metaphysical dispositionality is the possibility of coming to be actual by on part of a substance. This coming to be is a process which is not to be interpreted in the usual way as a temporal movement. Since I mean metaphysical dispositionality as an atemporal or detemporalized process, I will introduce the term processa to specify this idea. Metaphysical dispositionality is before time, outside time, and it is the possibility of coming to be really actual, we might say. In contrast, physical dispositionality is a temporal becoming which makes a physical possibility manifest. So, I want to show how this idea of process as a coming to be actual is present in Hegel. 1:00 P.M. BUTLER, CLARK ? Purdue University, Indiana-Purdue, Fort Wayne campus Advancing Research by the True Hegelian Rational Syllogism Classical logic started with the assumption of possible proofs with true premises. In treating the rational syllogism toward the end of the logic, Hegel makes a contribution to logic taking him beyond all such classical logic. The result is a paraconsistent relevance logic that ends in a holistic rejection of an assumed belief system without proving which assumption is wrong. Indirect proof, ever present in the objective logic, is weakened as merely indirect argument. The assumption weighed to be the least well-tested is rejected, and thought proceeds with the new set of assumptions until further notice. Premises, proofs, and simple true values are dropped. Without the deduction of truths, contradictory truths are blocked in dialectical logic. Analysis of the genuine rational syllogism frees thought from all forms of foundationalism and shows conditions of the possibility of a Hegelian research program going forward. 2:15 P.M. PRIEST, GRAHAM ?University of Melbourne and City University of New York Graduate Center The Logical Structure of Dialectic I give a formal model of dialectical progression, as found in Hegel and Marx. The model is outlined in the first half of the paper, and deploys the tools of a formal paraconsistent logic. In the second half, I discuss a number of examples of dialectical progressions to be found in Hegel and Marx, showing how they fit the model. 3:15 P.M. DJORDJEVIC, CHARLES ? London School of Economics Observations on Hegel?s ?Observing Reason? The goal of this paper is to re-frame some of Hegel's statements in the Phenomenology of Spirit about natural science in a way that is more understandable by contemporary practitioners in the philosophy of natural sciences. I first outline Hegel's project. Then I reconstruct his thoughts in ?Observing Reason? with a focus on laws and the nature of observation. I finally use an article by Frigg on models to show how Hegel can be applied into a contemporary debate. 3:15 P.M. MANDZAK-HEER, AMRIT ? Villanova University Hegel?s Idea of Truth and the Object-Language/Meta-Language Distinction In this paper, I suggest placing Hegel?s conception of truth in conversation with Tarski?s semantic conception of truth, despite the prima facie rejection of formal logic by Hegel, and despite the preclusion of self-reference by Tarski. Because Tarski?s own indefinability theorem demonstrates that truth for a language cannot, without self-referential paradox, be defined within that language, his solution was to institute a distinction between an object-language and a meta-language. By reading Hegel?s ?Idea of the True? in the Science of Logic, I argue that Hegel?s criticisms of formal logic, and its concept of truth, are concerned not with the distinction between form and content in toto, and thus not with formal logic in toto, but primarily with the arbitrariness of formalist relations between a meta-language and object-language. Hegel?s solution, I argue, is not simply to accept self-referential paradox as a ?true contradiction?, as dialetheist interpretations hold, but to theorize how self-referential contradiction in an object-language can be, under certain conditions, productive of a determinate truth predicate in a determinate meta-language. 4:15 P.M. CORWIN, JORDAN ? Notre Dame University ?Surrender to the Life of the Object?: Hegel on Mathematical Reasoning A case of underlying agreement is built between Hegel?s critique of mathematical reasoning that detaches the result from the artificial deduction by which it is reached and Poincar?s critique of the same kind of mathematical reasoning referred to under a non-Hegelian description. Agreement is also exhibited between the naturally self- propelling deduction preserved in the result that Hegel approves and the type of mathematical reasoning that Poincare prefers. 4:15 P.M. BURMEISTER, JON ? Associate Faculty, Boston College Hegel and Quine on Analytic Statements and Semantic Holism It will raise no great controversy to state that G.W.F. Hegel and W.V.O Quine mean very different things when they use such words as ?science,? ?philosophy, ?truth,? and ?the whole.? Nonetheless, these two thinkers share at least two striking similarities. First, they both reject the existence of analytic statements (as defined by Kant) within the activity of philosophy, claiming that a strict boundary between analytic and synthetic statements cannot be maintained. Second, both thinkers claim that the proper meaning of terms and the truth of statements can only be judged holistically, i.e., in relation to (what each of them calls) ?the whole.? In spite of the vast disagreements that these two thinkers have, this essay will show that their respective rejections of the analytic/synthetic distinction is what causes each of them to conclude that linguistic meaning and linguistic truth must be judged in light of the whole.   5:15 P.M. NUZZO, ANGELICA ? City University of New York Graduate Center Dialectic-speculative Logic, Formal Logic, Transcendental Logic I address the conference topic in a historical perspective. I look at the extent in which Hegel?s confrontation with traditional formal logic positively shapes his project of dialectic logic. This confrontation is complicated by the presence of Kant?s transcendental logic, which, in its turn, is the result of Kant?s own assessment and criticism of traditional formal logic. I discuss what constitutes the ?formality? of formal logic, and show how Hegel?s overcoming of formal logic through Kant is at the basis of his speculative ?concept? and ?determinate negation.? SATURDAY, OCTOBER 18 9:00 A.M. BRANDOM, ROBERT ? University of Pittsburgh Understanding the Object/Property Structure in Terms of Negation: An Introduction to Hegelian Logic and Metaphysics 10:00 A.M. TURKEN, ALPER ? Bogazici University (Turkey) Brandom vs Hegel: The Relation of Norma-tivity and Recognition to the True Infinite Robert Brandom?s neo-pragmatist interpretation of Hegel holds that Hegel understands norms, and therefore all conceptual commitments, as social achievements based on reciprocal recognition. This is expressed in the slogan ?For Hegel, all transcendental constitution is social institution.? An important difficulty with this interpretation lies in its failure to note that that Hegel?s concept of the true infinite is already operative in Hegel?s account of recognition in Phenomenology. Mutual recognition arises because the lord as the false infinite negates his negation of the bondsman, thus exemplifying the true infinite originally explained in the science of logic. What is missing in Brandom?s account is the concept of the true infinite which is in Hegel?s words the basic concept of philosophy and the speculative thought in its determining feature. A genuine Hegelian-turn in contemporary philosophy would require that this complex notion be domesticated in a manner faithful to its meaning for Hegel. 10:00 A.M. MODER, GREGOR* ? University of Ljubljana (Slovenia) Negativity in Contemporary Continental Philosophy: The Case of Hegel and Spinoza Hegel and Spinoza incited two of the most influential philosophical traditions that persist in continental theoretical struggles to this day. It seems that the two traditions are encamped in their positions and steadfastly reject each other. This mutual theoretical rejection is today perhaps nowhere seen as clearly as in the controversies between contemporary Deleuzians and Lacanians. The paper argues that underneath the historic questions within the Hegel?Spinoza dispute, there lies a central one that can be explicated as a question of negativity. Now, the thesis of the primacy of negativity can be seen at work in contemporary philosophy even in the most divergent lines of thought: in Heidegger's phenomenology, Gadamer?s hermeneutics, Althusser?s materialism of the encounter, Lacanian concept of not-All, Derrida?s deconstruction and in structuralism, and even in Deleuze. However, in these examples negativity is considered in different contexts and meanings, which allows for controversies to perpetuate without any progress. The paper attempts to tackle the controversy about negativity by tracing it back to the polemics between Hegelianism and Spinozism. This allows us to distinguish between ?lacuna? and ?torsion? as two dominant concepts of negativity in contemporary co1ntinental philosophy.? * The speaker will be brought in from Slovenia by Skype. The paper represents contemporary Continental Philosophy as the determinate other of the analytic tradition and manner of doing philosophy. It highlight how the theme of negativity with Hegelian roots in Continental Philosophy bears comparison with the theme of negativity, negation, or contradiction in recently Hegel-related analytic philosophy. The speaker has agreed to look at, with possible comments, a few pages in which the conference organizers propose certain translations of chief points by recent Continental Philosophers into, or in relation to, points by certain contemporary philosophers in the analytic tradition. These pages will be distributed at the conference. 11:00 A.M. PAPA, STEFANO ? University of Vienna Logical Life and Default Logic In the Subjective Logic (1816, III Book of The Science of Logic) Hegel claims that cognition is the concept?s self-comprehension and opposes ?logical life? to the externality of existence and to spirit. In the latter, life obtains its articulations (determinateness) from its externality (presuppositions and purposes): ?the objectivity which stands indifferent against it?. Life as a living individual, on the other hand, can be understood as the stage of intuitionistic mathematics: the constructional mental activity of the living individual; both the living individual and spirit rely on ?logical life? for the ?transition into cognition?. We ask whether the ?Idea of Life by itself?, as emancipated from externalities (institutions and conditionings), is compatible with the role logic is assigned in modern knowledge representation systems (default logic). 11:00 A.M. BEACH, EDWARD ? University of Wisconsin?Eau Claire Hegel?s Friendly Critique of Analytic Reason & Mathematical Logic I will first examine Hegel?s major criticisms regarding the alleged limitations of formal mathematical logic. I will then examine the alternative kind of logic that he proposes to supplement the formal kind. This discussion will also raise questions as to the validity and soundness of Hegel?s approach to traditional logic within the framework of his system as a whole. At the conclusion of the paper, I will briefly consider whether Hegel, if he were alive today, would wish to revise his position on the limitations of mathematical logic. 12:00 P.M. REDDING, PAUL ? University of Sydney Hegel?s Weakly Inferentialist, Pluralist Logic With his ?inferentialist? approach to semantics, Robert Brandom has shed much light on Hegel?s strangely sounding claim that the syllogism is the ?truth? of the judgment: we cannot have a conception of what is actually said in a judgment without understanding its relations to other judgments in patterns of potential inference. In this paper I argue that, on examination, Hegel?s inferentialism is weaker than Brandom?s own, in that for Hegel inferential relations are necessary but not sufficient for a judgment to have content. This in turn, I suggest, is linked to the pluralist nature of his logic. That is, Hegel employs two distinct but mutually presupposing senses of the nature of both predication and logical consequence?one ?immediate?, the other ?mediated?. Finally, I suggest an alternate way of thinking of Hegel?s logical pragmatics by appealing to a contextually specific intentional attitude and a corresponding mode of communicative sociality to complement what Brandom discusses in terms of the notions of doxastic commitment and mutual entitlement-tracking (deontic score-keeping). In this alternative, distinctly Aristotelian logical forms are seen as expressive of the comparatively ?immediate? recognitive relations structuring family-like realms of association, where the weight is on the sharing of presuppositions. In this I draw on conceptions of pragmatics that have been offered by Peter Strawson and Robert Stalnaker. 2:00 P.M. SCHULTE, THOMAS ? University of Chicago From Opposition to Ground: Two Forms of Contradiction in Hegel? Given Hegel?s particularly bold claims about the pervasiveness of apparently true contradictions and the inability of thought to come to rest with contradictions, one is astonished to see that Hegel devotes only a few pages to the subject in his Science of Logic. I intend to explore Hegel?s brief treatment of the subject more deeply with the aim of illuminating the ubiquitous role he intends for contradiction. I first distinguish between two forms of contradiction in the Doctrine of Essence: the contradiction of opposition and the self-contradiction of ground. I argue that, while the former is resolved rather quickly in the Logic, the latter contradiction is an expression of a problematic especially central throughout the Doctrine of Essence. 2:00 P.M. FICARA, ELENA ? Technical University of Berlin Hegel's Nutty Negation In dialectical determinate negation, negation is contradictory forming operator, and can therefore count as formal negation? Yet as is clear in contemporary glutty [paraconsistent] semantics of negation, one may distinguish between different accounts of the relationship between negation, contradiction and content. I suggest that, differently from classical negation, and as glutty negation, dialectical negation has partial content. Dialectical negation both is a classical contradictory forming operator and has some content (as glutty semantics of negation suggest). I have problems with those interpretations that stress the non‐logical nature of Hegel?s view, interpreting dialectical negation as incompatibility or contrariety. Yet incompatibility, despite its role in dialectics, is not dialectical determinate negation.