14-15 May 2010
Stirling, Scotland
Registration is now open for the workshop Degrees of Belief vs Belief taking place at the University of Stirling on the 14th-15th May 2010. This is the second of a series of workshops looking at issues located in the area of overlap between formal and traditional epistemology. Confirmed speakers for the workshop are: David Christensen (Brown) Branden Fitelson (Berkeley) & Kenny Easwaran (USC) Alan Hjek (ANU) Carl Hoefer (Barcelona) Peter Milne (Stirling) Brian Weatherson (Rutgers/Arche) The workshop is organised by Philip Ebert (Stirling), Peter Milne (Stirling ) & Martin Smith (Glasgow). Registration: Please send an email to philipebert@mac.com. The attendance fee is 30 an d covers Tea/Cofee/Lunch on Saturday. The conference dinner on Friday is 2 0. We have five subsidised places for Postgraduate Students/Unwaged (free attendance/20 dinner). [ ] Attendance without dinner (30) [ ] Attendance with dinner (50) [ ] Attendance Student/Unwaged without dinner (free) [ ] Attendance Student with dinner (20) The website for the event with a provisional timetable is: http://web.me.com/philipebert/FTE/Events.html The workshop starts on Friday at 2pm. Aim of the Workshop: The general thought behind this workshop is to bring together both formal a nd traditional epistemologists for an event dedicated to a topic lying w ithin the area of overlap between the two. The topic for the workshop is the relationship between beliefs and degrees of belief. The notion of belief is often used by ?traditional? epistemologists, while the idea of degrees of belief is at the heart of formal methods in epistemology and the philosophy of science. We welcome papers that that tackle the relationship between degree s of belief and belief head-on, as well as papers on a range of related topics, such as competing models of rational degrees of belief (probability functions, DS-functions, ranking functions etc.), closure principles for rational beli ef, the explanatory role of beliefs and/or degrees of belief vis a vis behaviou r, the lottery and preface paradoxes etc. Sponsors: British Society for the Philosophy of Science, Scots Phil Association, University of Stirling and the Departments of Philosophy at Glasgow & Stirl ing.