Logic List Mailing Archive

"Reductionism, Explanation and Metaphors in the Philosophy of Mind"

17-18 Sep 2009
Bremen, Germany

Reductionism, Explanation and Metaphors in the Philosophy of Mind
Workshop: 17-18 September 2009
(Workshop following the GAP-conference in Bremen, Germany)
Start: 17th Sept. 2009:; 3 p.m.              End: 18th Sept. 2009, 6.30 p.m
.

To register please send an email to: Raphael vanRiel 
<Raphael.vanRiel@ruhr-uni-bochum.de>

More details under:
http://www.ruhr-uni-bochum.de/philosophy/staff/newen/gap_workshops_2009/ind
ex.html

Workshop Announcement: The widely accepted naturalistic paradigm imposes 
certain constraints on explanations and models in the Philosophy of Mind an
d in 
Neurosciences. The aim of this workshop is to discuss these constraints fro
m 
different perspectives, focusing on different types of explanations that ca
n be 
found in Neuroscience and n the Philosophy of Mind. In this context, 
metaphorical ways of talking in the Philosophy of Mind are particularly 
interesting: For example, Singer talks about a "dialogue between brains", F
odor 
postulated a "language of thought", Goldman explains social cognition in te
rms 
of "simulation", and computer metaphors are still dominating some areas in 
the 
philosophy of mind. These terms have in common that they express, if taken
 
literally, concepts that apply to artifacts. But obviously, reduction canno
t be 
successful if neuronal systems turned out to be artifacts. Other metaphoric
al 
constructions are quite common place, like "being in the mind", "explanator
y 
gap", and "reflective consciousness".  This gives rise to several closely
 
connected questions: Which role do these metaphors play in reductive 
explanations? Are they innocent or problematic? How do they relate to diffe
rent 
types of explanations, like functional explanations, explanations in terms 
of 
models or mechanistic explanations? Which role do metaphors play in 
explanations in general? Which type of explanation is the most promising if
 we 
attempt to reduce mental talk? And what exactly are the criteria imposed by
 the 
reductionist paradigm?

Keynote Speakers:
Andreas Bartels (Bonn)
Michael Esfeld (Lausanne)
Robert van Gulick (Syracuse)
Stephan Hartmann (Tilburg)
Albert Newen (Bochum)
David Papineau (London)
Raphael van Riel (Bochum)
Louise Rska-Hardy (Witten)
Christian Sachse (Lausanne)

Scientific organization: Prof. Dr. Albert Newen and Raphael van Riel, 
Ruhr-Universitt Bochum To register please send an email to: Raphael vanR
iel 
<Raphael.vanRiel@ruhr-uni-bochum.de>

Organzition:
Prof. Dr. Albert Newen  and   Raphael van Riel
Ruhr-Universitt Bochum
Institut fr Philosophie; GA3/152
Universittsstrae 150
D-44780 Bochum

Tel.: +49-234- 32-22139
Fax: +49-234- 32-14963